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DETERMINANTS OF UK BOX OFFICE SUCCESS: THE IMPACT OF 
QUALITY SIGNALS 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the roles of various potential quality signals in the demand for 
cinema in the United Kingdom using a breakdown of advertising totals by media 
category. Estimation of a two stage least squares model with data for 546 films 
released in the United Kingdom shows that the impacts of types of advertising on box 
office revenues vary both in channels and magnitudes of impact. We also offer a more 
sophisticated treatment of critical reviews than hitherto by examining the spread 
(entropy) rather than just the mean rating.  
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Despite the availability of new media for home viewing, cinema admissions have 
remained buoyant in both the US and UK. The experience of watching a film in a 
collective environment in front of a large screen, via paid admission, is still attractive 
to many as is watching a film recently released that is discussed by the public and the 
media. There has been a rising trend in UK cinema admissions over the period 1995-
2004 with 170 million visits recorded for 2004 (UK Film Council Statistical 
Yearbook 2004/5). Hence, despite the growth of potentially substitute products, 
cinema-going remains a very popular activity, especially for people aged between 15 
and 29.  
 
Films can be considered as experience goods in which the quality, as perceived by the 
consumer, is only fully revealed after the good is consumed (Nelson, 1970; Shapiro 
and Varian, 1999). Filmgoers may well have an expectation of the film’s likely 
quality but this expectation can be either exceeded or unfulfilled. In choosing whether 
to go to a cinema to watch a film, an individual has available the title, genre, rating 
certificate, cast and director of the production. Sometimes the film will be a sequel, in 
which case the experience and record of the previous offering are factors that will 
determine willingness to view the follow-up product. Another attribute of a film is the 
size of budget. A large production budget could be taken as a signal of higher quality. 
These indicators may be supplemented by a number of other potential quality signals. 
The goal of this paper is to assess the relative importance of different quality signals 
for success of films released in the United Kingdom. These include the nomination 
and winning of awards, of which the most famous are the US Academy Awards or 
‘Oscars’ (Nelson et al. 2001). We also consider critical reviews. As with many other 
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entertainment products, such as books, music CDs and theatre productions, films are 
typically reviewed by critics in a number of newspapers and magazines and readers 
can use these reviews to help form a judgement on their expected utility of viewing 
the film. Increasingly, these reviews are summarised by easy-to-read numerical scores 
out of five or 10 to aid readers with high opportunity cost of time. A growing 
empirical literature is devoted to analysis of the impacts of third-party reviews in 
diverse settings such as Broadway shows (Reddy, Swaminathan and Motley, 1998) 
and books (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2003; Sorensen and Rasmussen, 2004).  
 
Critical reviews are important to the industry. Where favourable, extracts from critics’ 
reviews are used in advertising the film, especially in press and outdoor advertising.  
Some US research has highlighted the helpful role that positive reviews play in 
raising box office revenues (Eliashberg and Shugan, 1997; Reinstein and Snyder, 
2005). As proposed by Eliashberg and Shugan, strong critical acclaim can mean either 
of two things. First, a positive review could be read by filmgoers and could influence 
their decision to view a film. Second, a positive review could simply be a proxy for 
film quality and so critical acclaim is a predictor of film success.  Reinstein and 
Snyder (2005) distinguish empirically between these two functions of critics. They 
find a small but statistically significant influencing role for ratings for dramas and 
small-release films offered by two high-profile film critics in the US which they 
identify as an influence effect, with positive reviews having a significantly larger 
effect on revenues than negative or mixed reviews. 
 
We offer several innovations missing from the typical treatment of critical reviews in 
previous work. The first of these is to model the spread, or entropy, of reviews. 
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Studies have typically focussed on average or total critic scores with less attention to 
dispersion of opinions (Chang and Ki, 2005; Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003; Litman 
and Kohl, 1989). A relevant question is whether a consensus of reviews, with a 
narrower range, influence box office returns positively or negatively. While Basuroy 
et al. (2006) address spread of reviews; their analysis of this issue is constrained by 
more limited review data. 2  
 
A further related question, which we consider below, is which critics, if any, 
command attention from the cinema-going public. Collins et al. (2002) use critical 
reviews based on a UK film magazine, Empire. This magazine is oriented towards 
cinema fans and its readership is more specialised and probably less representative of 
audiences than that of national newspapers. Moreover, the reviews published in 
Empire tend to be less critical and more enthusiastic than counterparts in several 
newspapers. Looking at the predictive effect of reviews, it could be the case that some 
critics are more in tune with the majority of the film-going audience than others. If so, 
this may mean that greater dispersion of critical opinions could be correlated 
positively with box office revenues, since some critics are better barometers of public 
opinion. We address this issue directly below. 
 
The overwhelming majority of films in our sample are American productions that 
have been released in the US prior to UK opening. It is pertinent to ask whether there 
are spillover effects from American critical acclaim to British audience response. This 
can be tested using a measure of aggregate US critic score. 
 
                                                          
2 Basuroy, Chatterjee and Ravid (2003) investigate the impacts of critical reviews on US opening box 
office revenues and find that the adverse effects of negative reviews are greater than the beneficial 
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Nelson (1974) argued that advertising can be a signal of quality, as a firm will only be 
willing to invest in large advertising expenditures if confident about the quality of the 
product being promoted and the long run sales return to the advertising expenditure.  
Nelson’s argument rests on the assumption of repeat purchases but, for films, an 
analogous occurrence is amplification of customer responses though ‘word of mouth’ 
recommendation. However, there are numerous motives for advertising. Schmalensee 
(1978) developed a model in which advertising can signal product quality, but unlike 
later analyses he assumes a fixed industry price.  Given the low variability in the price 
of cinema admissions tickets, his model may aid understanding of film advertising 
and its consequences.  An important outcome in his 1978 model is that perverse 
equilibria may exist, in which low quality firms may have the largest advertising 
expenditure, sales and profits.  While high quality firms may enjoy a greater long run 
sales effect of advertising, low quality firms can offset this if they have lower costs of 
production, giving rise to higher price cost margins.   
 
The effectiveness of alternative forms of advertising, as quality signals, is open to 
question. It may be the case that advertising is undertaken simply because 
stakeholders, including producers and actors, expect this to happen.3 Alternatively, 
Salop and Scheffman (1983) suggest that firms will engage in advertising to raise 
their rivals’ costs as competitors are forced to copy advertising expenditures to avoid 
risking market share. Nelson (1974) also argued that advertising will help consumers 
make better informed choices, such that purchases more closely match their 
preferences.  Hence, the variety of advertising media used may reflect attempts being 
made to ensure that advertising has a coordination role, better coordinating 
                                                                                                                                                                      
impacts of positive reviews.  
 7
individuals’ film preferences and consumption.4 Ultimately, film advertising may 
serve one or more of a number of potential roles of which a quality signal is only one.  
Hence, while the analysis below can identify the impact of advertising on box office 
success, it is impossible to conclude whether the effectiveness of advertising reflects 
the use of advertising as a quality signal. 
 
Although some research has found a positive influence of total advertising on box 
office revenues (Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003, Prag and Casavant, 1994) few studies 
have been able to disaggregate total advertising into its components.5 In the film 
industry, advertising comprises four main types. First, there are advertisements placed 
in local and national press. Second, films selected for wide-scale national release are 
typically pre-announced by advertising posters on a large number of billboards and on 
buses. Third, films are advertised on commercial radio stations. Fourth, a selected 
number of films will be advertised on commercial television by means of short 
trailers. This paper offers a contribution to the literature on modelling box office 
returns as the modelling permits the impacts of advertising in these four media to be 
distinguished.  
 
To date, Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) are the only authors to separate the impacts of 
total advertising on box office revenue through supply-side effects (number of screens 
allocated to particular films) and demand-side effects (customer response, controlling 
for number of screens). They did this using a structural three equation model, 
estimated not just for the US but four European countries as well, including the UK. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Quite often, actors will sign contracts for appearances in films on the understanding that the film will 
receive substantial advertising promotion.  
4 Although note that an assumption that firms behave in this way contradicts the perverse equilibria 
result of Schmalensee (1978). 
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In this paper, we offer a parsimonious instrumental variables model of (log) total box 
office revenues in which (log) opening screens is the endogenous variable. The 
convention in the literature is to assume that advertising is exogenous to box office 
revenues (Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003). Arguably, advertising should also be treated 
as an endogenous variable within a system of equations. In our case, this can only be 
achieved by using a single total advertising variable. This would entail a considerable 
loss of information given that we have data on each of the four main advertising 
media expenditures. Moreover, these expenditures may vary in size of effects on box 
office revenues. Given the vastly different advertising expenditures across films, we 
predict that an endogenous total advertising variable will have an insignificant impact 
on total box office revenues. This is confirmed by a three stage least squares 
regression model (not reported due to space constraints) with log opening screens, log 
advertising and log total box office revenues as dependent variables.6  
 
Various authors have tackled the problem of modelling determinants of box office 
success. Papers have focused on the roles of stars (Ravid, 1999, Elberse (2005)), R-
rated films (Ravid and Basuroy, 2004) and the impact of winning Oscars (Nelson et 
al. 2001). So far, the literature on determination of box office revenues has given 
greater attention to the impacts of critical reviews than to the effectiveness of 
advertising (see Table 1). Moreover, very few studies consider critical reviews and 
advertisements as joint determinants of box office revenues. In this paper we consider 
both advertising and critical reviews. The essential research questions analysed here 
are, first, to what extent advertising expenditures can influence box office revenues 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 A notable exception is Robertson’s (2003) report for the UK Film Council. 
6 Results are available on request. 
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when other quality signals are available and, second, the extent to which critical 
reviews are predictors of film success. 
 
We also examine the potential for interaction between advertising expenditure and 
some of the other quality signals mentioned above. For example, it might be the case 
that heavy advertising could offset the adverse effects on box office returns from bad 
reviews. Alternatively, distributors may decide to cut their losses following bad 
reviews and actually reduce advertising expenditure. Advertising effort may be 
particularly strong for films that are nominated for awards as distributors see the 
opportunity to cash in on the greater prestige and recognition that awards bring about. 
Far-sighted distributors may spot award-winning potential in advance and may 
promote films more heavily in anticipation of a film gaining awards. 
 
2. Model Selection and Data 
The UK film industry comprises production companies, distributors and exhibitors. 
We focus on the relationship between distributors and exhibitors. Distributors and 
producers share the expenses of promoting a film; most of the advertising budget is 
spent by distributors. The distribution sector is dominated by a small number of major 
studios.7 In the UK, the exhibition sector is also oligopolistic, with the six largest 
exhibitors owning 70 per cent of screens (Robertson, UK Film Council, 2003).  
 
We estimate an instrumental variables model of the determination of total revenues 
(TR), with opening screens (OS) treated as endogenous and each variable expressed in 
                                                          
7 These are: Buena Vista, Columbia Tristar, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Universal International 
Pictures and Warner. Note that each studio has its own subsidiary studios and is part of a bigger media 
conglomerate. For example, Buena Vista owns Miramax and Walt Disney Productions while New 
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logs. The specification of the model underlying the two-stage least squares estimates 
is: 
 
TR = a1OS + CRITICb1 + X1b2 + ADVb3 + Prize*ADVb4 + u1      (1) 
OS = CRITICb5 + X1b6 + ADVb7 + Prize*ADVb8 + Wp + u2 (2) 
where: 
 CRITIC is a vector of measures of critical review 
 ADV is a vector of advertising values 
Prize*ADV is a vector of advertising values interacted with nomination for a 
major award 
X1 is a vector of controls that appear in both equations 
W is a vector of instruments that influence opening screens but do not directly 
affect box office revenues 
u1 and u2 are random errors 
a, b and p are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
The model recognises the sequential structure of industry decision-making: opening 
screens are determined before revenues. Instruments were selected by prior inspection 
of the correlation matrix for all variables and then checked using preliminary 
regression analysis. Instruments for opening screens include log budget, log US 
opening revenues and dummy variables for major studios, for UK productions 
distributed by major studios and for genres. 
 
Data on opening screens, US opening revenues and total UK box office revenues were 
obtained from the box office section of the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com), 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Line, which distributed the highly successful Lord of the Rings trilogy, is owned by Warner, itself part 
of Time-Warner AOL.   
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henceforth IMDb, which is a rich source of information about current and older films. 
All monetary values were converted to real sterling at 1996 prices. We found 
consistent data for 546 films released between 1999 and 2003.  Descriptive statistics 
for our continuous variables are shown in Table 2.   
 
Explanatory Variables  
Indicators Determined by Producers and Distributors 
In equation (2), we allow the (log) number of opening screens to depend on log 
budget of the film and log US opening weekend revenue (log US open) as reported in 
the IMDb. If no US opening revenue was reported or the US opening was after the 
UK opening, we inserted a zero log value, essentially creating a slope dummy for 
films that open in the US before the UK.  Dummy variables were created for genre of 
film by classifying the following types: drama, comedy, romantic comedy, action and 
adventure, thriller, horror, science fiction and animation. These categories are 
sometimes overlapping and blurred and we attempted to classify using a combination 
of the IMDb records and summary reviews offered by the Guardian newspaper 
website www.guardianunlimited.co.uk. The base category, also the most frequent, is 
drama. A further set of dummy variables identifies major studios separately, with all 
non-major distributors set at zero. UK and joint UK productions were identified by a 
UK production dummy variable to check if UK productions gained any sort of 
advantage in screen allocation or at the box office. UK independent producers and 
distributors sometimes complain that their films suffer a disadvantage in screen 
allocations compared to films distributed by major studios, an entry barrier in the UK 
film exhibition market. To test for such an effect we interact UK production with 
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another dummy variable for major studio to generate UK major and enter this variable 
in the screen equation alongside the separate major studio dummy variables.  
Some films are released in the UK before the US; typically, these are of European or 
Asian origin. Such films are categorised by the dummy variable, UK first. 
 
We also have dummy variables for films that represent a sequel, a remake (e.g. 
Psycho) and are derived from a television show (e.g. Charlie’s Angels). We expect 
sequels to be particularly important. It is now the ambition of distributors and 
exhibitors to generate franchises for films, where audiences are committed to a long-
lasting project with films as episodes. The Harry Potter and Lord of the Rings series 
are the highly successful role models in this regard. For the total revenue equation (1), 
dummy variables were also created for type of certificate (cert U, Parental Guidance, 
cert 12, cert 15 and cert 18). Initially, the 15 category was omitted.  
  
Nielsen ADC provided total amounts spent in the United Kingdom on each of four 
categories of advertising by year between 1999 to 2003, by film and by year. These 
categories are television, press, outdoor (poster campaigns) and radio. Care was taken 
to remove films for which advertising expenditure occurred in 1998 and 2004, to 
avoid censoring of the data. We also removed advertising data for years following a 
cinema release, which might capture advertising directed towards DVD and video 
sales or rentals. Again, values were expressed in log values at constant prices; zero 
log values were inserted where no advertising spending occurred. The resulting 
variables, are denoted by log TV advertising, log outdoor advertising, log press 
advertising and log radio advertising and this sequence is also the ranking of 
conditional mean values of advertising. As in the US, television advertising is both 
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the most expensive medium and the category attracting greatest expenditure (Elberse 
and Anand, 2005). 
 
Films nominated for best actor, best actress or best film awards at the BAFTA and 
Oscar ceremonies each spring are represented by a dummy variable, prize; 48 such 
films were identified. It is possible that producers and distributors raise their 
advertising efforts for films that they perceive will win awards. Indeed, the mean level 
of (real) television advertising for films nominated for award is £426,627 compared 
with £299,291 for non-nominated films. A one-sided t-test rejects the null of equality 
of means (p value = 0.01)8. A similar t-test rejects equality of means of press 
advertising between nominated and non-nominated films (p value = 0.00). To explore 
this type of difference in a multivariate setting, we interact prize with each of our 
advertising types.   
 
Critical Reviews 
UK critical reviews were extracted from The Guardian newspaper’s website 
www.guardianunlimited.co.uk. The Guardian compiles ratings from a selection of reviews 
on a scale of zero to 109. The papers surveyed were Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily 
Mirror, Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times and The Sun. 
Not all paper reviews were available for each film and in some cases only two 
reviews were reported. Nevertheless, this data base offers a reasonable cross-section 
of British newspaper reviews of films. All reviews were produced before or during 
                                                          
8 All t tests of differences in sample means permit unequal variance between the two sub-samples. 
9 The appearance of stars for reviews of a number of leisure and entertainment goods is now a common 
feature of current UK newspaper reporting. Easy-to-read star summaries are published inter alia for 
films, music CDs, musical concerts, art exhibitions, stand-up comedy and restaurants. This is probably 
a response to higher marginal valuation of leisure time of increasingly busy readers. Film reviews are 
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opening weekend of release. As the host of this comparison, The Guardian has 
greatest review coverage followed by Daily Mail; coverage of reviews by The Sun 
was rather thin. Coincidentally or not, the newspapers with highest average scores 
(Daily Mirror and The Sun) also have larger circulations than their rivals, are more 
populist in tone and deliberately appeal to a readership of lower social class than the 
so-called ‘quality’ newspapers such as The Times or The Guardian.10 A kernel density 
plot reveals an approximately normal distribution of average scores; all critics used a 
full range of marks from zero or one to 10 in their reviews. Average scores by 
newspaper are between 4.38 and 6.22 while standard deviations vary between 2.36 
(Express) and 2.78 (Mail). In our model, we use the average critics’ scores, from 
those available, denoted by average UK critic.  
 
We also ask whether a greater diversity of critical review is good or bad for box office 
returns. On the one hand, if critics are more united in their opinions, given a particular 
average score, then filmgoers may have more confidence in the ability of reviewers to 
assess quality. This fits with the literature on consensus forecasting, in which a score 
based on uniform opinions has greater predictive content than scores from more 
diverse opinions.11 On the other hand, if there is greater diversity of opinion this could 
mean that that some critics are more in tune with filmgoer opinions than others. Since 
some critics write for mass circulation newspapers while others report for lower 
circulation, upmarket ‘quality’ papers this is a distinct possibility. It is also just 
possible that critics representing mass-market newspapers might offer generally more 
                                                                                                                                                                      
usually compiled on a score of one to five stars but the Guardian site adapts these to a score of zero to 
10 based upon its interpretation of review content. 
10 The Sun is Britain’s best selling daily newspaper with over 3 million readers per day in 2004 
(www.media.guardian.co.uk)). This is followed by the Daily Mirror with 1.7 million daily readers. The 
Guardian and The Independent had 360,000 and 266,000 daily readers.  
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favourable reviews in order to attract greater press advertising from producers and 
distributors (Moul and Shugan, 2005).  
 
We construct a variable, spread, which is the range (maximum minus minimum) of 
critics’ scores for a particular film. A higher spread denotes greater diversity of 
opinion. If consensus forecasting is an important consideration in filmgoers’ 
attendance decisions then the coefficient on spread is predicted to be negative. If some 
critics are more in line with popular opinion then others, and offer more favourable 
reviews, we expect the coefficient on spread to be negative. We note that the 
correlation coefficient between the spread and average UK critic is a mere 0.05. 
In the US, Reinstein and Snyder (2005) focused on the information contained in 
reviews by two celebrated US film critics who presented their evaluations on 
television. We must caution that the critics whose reviews are summarised here are 
certainly not household names. Indeed, some newspapers use more than one critic. 
We find the predictive role for film critics, as barometers of public opinion, more 
persuasive than an influential role, a priori. Nevertheless, quotations from UK critics’ 
reviews often appear, when favourable, in press and outdoor advertising. 
 
 Another measure of critical acclaim is the average US critic rating, which is known 
prior to UK release for all but a few films in our sample. The web site, 
www.metacritic.com, offers a summary score (from zero to 100) of a set of 50 American 
film reviews drawn from major US newspapers, denoted here by average US critic. 
Like the UK critics, a wide range of scores is used.12 We divide the scores by 10 to 
make these comparable with average UK critic. The correlation coefficient between 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 See Forrest and Simmons (2000) for an application of consensus forecasting to prediction of soccer 
results by a set of newspaper pundits.  
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average US critic and average UK critic is high, at 0.77, so there is a risk of 
multicollinearity when including both as explanatory variables.   
 
De Vany and Walls (1999, 2002) show that US cinema revenues follow a non-
standard (i.e. non-normal) distribution in which the variance of log box office 
revenues is unbounded and high degrees of skewness are observed.13 The classical 
assumptions of well-defined mean and constant, finite variance are violated. 
Accordingly, De Vany and Walls model US box office revenues using various non-
standard statistical distributions, such as the Pareto distribution, to handle the excess 
kurtosis prevalent in box office revenues (see also Walls, 2005, who applies the t-
skew distribution). The principal cost of imposing non-standard, but more 
appropriate, distributions is that it is only possible to estimate a reduced form model. 
Computational complexity rules out estimation of a structural model. We wish to 
model the interaction between supply-side and demand-side influences on box office 
revenues using a system of equations. In response to the critique of De Vany and 
Walls, we subject the standard errors of our estimated effects to bootstrapping, so as 
to generate reliable t-statistics for inference (Davison and Hinkley, 1997; MacKinnon, 
2002). The advantage of the bootstrap method is that it facilitates computation of 
robust standard errors in the presence of both non-normality of residuals and 
heteroskedasticity. Importantly in our context, the bootstrap method does not 
necessitate imposition of a particular distribution on our dependent variables. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 www.metacritic.com does not reveal maximum, minimum or standard deviation for its scores. 
13 See Collins, Hand and Snell (2002) who argue that UK box office revenues are subject to similar 
distributional problems. Their resolution is to use an ordered logit model in which they impose 
threshold revenue values. As they point out, this procedure does entail substantial loss of information. 
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3. Empirical Results  
Our results from Two Stage Least Squares estimation, in log-linear form and with 
bootstrapped standard errors based upon 200 replications, are shown in Tables 3, 4 
and 514. Table 3 presents our preferred model with the highest number of observations 
across the three sets of results.  R squared values for total box office and opening 
screens are 0.60 and 0.47, respectively. The high variation in opening screens is more 
difficult to explain by our model, even with low outliers removed. Looking first at the 
linkages between the endogenous variables, we find that the elasticity of total box 
office revenue with respect to opening week screens is 1.741. At first glance this 
value may appear rather high. But, if we assume that the elasticity from opening 
revenue to total revenue is one or higher, which seems plausible, then our estimate is 
comparable to the elasticity of opening revenues with respect to opening screens of 
1.51 found by Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) in their model of UK opening weekend 
revenues for a sample of US films released in 1999.  
 
Genre effects are pronounced for opening screens where, except for animation and 
thriller, all categories attract larger screen allocations than drama. Horror and science 
fiction films attract more screenings than dramas and also have significantly greater 
opening box office revenues (at 10 per cent). But action/adventure and comedy 
releases open with significantly more screens than dramas yet do not earn 
significantly greater opening or total box office revenues, suggesting a possible 
misallocation of screens by exhibitors. Studio effects for non-UK films are 
pronounced for screen allocations where, compared to independent distributors, 
                                                          
14 Two alternative functional forms were considered. One was a polynomial with endogenous variables 
entered as levels and continuous explanatory variables as powers up to cubic. The second form had 
endogenous variables as log odds (ln (y/(2*max y – y)) and continuous regressors as linear. Each of 
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significantly higher opening screenings (at five per cent on a one-tailed test) were 
granted to films from all the noted major studios. Interestingly, the impact of UK 
major on opening screens shows that UK films distributed by any of the major studios 
had an advantage of 26.2 per cent over UK films unattached to the majors. This 
reveals the extent of entry barrier to UK films distributed by independents in securing 
opening screen allocations. 
 
Other instruments for opening screens include budget and US opening revenue and 
preliminary testing reveals that neither variable has a significant impact on total box 
office revenues. Higher US box office opening revenues and higher budgets each 
translate significantly into greater screen allocations and then into higher total box 
office revenues. 
 
Impacts of certificate appear on total box office revenues, where family-oriented Cert 
U  films gain 52.5 per cent more total revenue than films with other certificates, 
ceteris paribus.15 This highlights the importance of family-oriented films for the 
industry; when a young child sees a film, he or she needs adult accompaniment and 
this will necessarily raise box office revenues. U rated films may represent a different 
market segment, as suggested by the alternative marketing vehicles used for these 
films such as product tie-ins and offers in conjunction purchases of cereals and fast 
food meals. We reran our model excluding U rated films. With 504 observations, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
these had lower R2 in all equations and much higher bootstrapped standard errors for the advertising 
and critical review variables. 
15 For dummy variables and with log box office revenue as dependent variable, the impact is evaluated 
by the formula eβ – 1 where β is the estimated coefficient. 
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rather than 546, the results were robust and the explanatory power of each equation 
improved slightly.16  
 
Sequels have a strong positive influence on both opening screens and total box office 
revenues. The combined effect on total revenues is 71.3 per cent, revealing the 
importance of successful ‘franchises’ for producers, distributors and exhibitors. Note 
that the coefficients on remake and television show were never found to be 
significantly different from zero so these variables were dropped from the analysis.    
 
Advertising Impacts 
Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) found that total UK advertising expenditure had a 
positive impact on UK opening screens but no effect on opening revenues. Our results 
substantially modify this finding. A significant supply-side impact of advertising, 
through opening weekend UK screens, is obtained for television advertising, but not 
the other categories, reflecting an impact of pre film release television advertising.17 
Meanwhile, outdoor and radio advertising each have demand-side effects on total 
revenues. The impacts of outdoor and radio advertising, although significant 
statistically, are quite modest numerically. A 10 per cent increase in outdoor and radio 
advertising leads to higher box office revenues of 0.32 per cent and 0.30 per cent, 
respectively. On a proportionate comparison of revenue impacts, and setting aside 
cost considerations, television advertising is more effective than outdoor and radio 
advertising with a supply-side impact via opening screens of 0.89 per cent.18. As 
                                                          
16 Results are available from the authors on request. 
17 More recently distributors have also increasingly invested in Internet advertising of film trailers, such 
that Internet film advertising may be expected to impact on opening screens in a similar way. 
18 Some films have zero television advertising. This is consistent with a signalling model of advertising 
(Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984, Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) in which films with low quality will not be 
advertised but films of high quality will be advertised. 
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noted above, one strand of game-theoretic literature in advertising economics suggests 
that advertising is used strategically as a means of sustaining a competitive position 
against rivals rather than being designed to raise revenues and/or profits. Compared 
with that view, we find that extra film advertising expenditures are more than just 
strategic and do help generate modest additional box office revenues.  These effects 
on total box office revenues suggest that advertising does more than help stimulate 
initial audiences and can add to ‘word of mouth’ dissemination of film quality as film 
revenues grow beyond opening weekend values.   
 
We also find that the impact of press advertising on total box office revenues is only 
apparent for films that are nominated for the prestigious BAFTA and Academy of 
Motion Picture awards (Oscars). For award-nominated films, an increase in press 
advertising of 10 per cent is estimated to result in a rise in total box office revenues of 
5.82 per cent. We regard this as evidence of forward-looking behaviour by producers 
and distributors; films that are likely to win awards are more heavily promoted via 
press advertising. Our result on interaction of award nomination and advertising 
suggests first, that advertising is selectively determined by producers and distributors  
and is not imposed uniformly across films and second, that peer assessment by award 
nomination is itself a quality signal, capable of amplification by extra advertising. 
Potential filmgoers take notice of award nominations and are encouraged to view a 
film by the extensive press advertising built upon award nomination.  
 
Critical Reviews 
Higher average critic ratings are associated with increased box office revenues. The 
total effect of a one point increase in average critic is a 25.1 per cent gain in total box 
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office revenue. Of course, this is a one point gain across a set of reviewers which may 
be difficult to achieve when critics have diverse opinions. The positive and significant 
coefficient on spread shows that, for given average score, an increased range of 
ratings enhances gross revenues, seemingly contradicting the idea that consensus 
reviews help raise audience levels. Hence, although higher average ratings are 
generally correlated with greater box office revenues we have found substantial 
evidence modifying that simple relationship with significant roles for range of 
opinions.  
 
Table 4 reports regression results with the addition of average US critic as an 
explanatory variable. Lack of availability of scores for all films reduce the sample size 
to 523.19 The coefficient on this variable in the total revenue equation is significant 
and positive, with a point estimate somewhat smaller than for average UK critic, 
which seems plausible as awareness of critical acclaim is likely to be greater when 
awarded by domestic sources.  
  
The role of spread in the earlier results may conceal an ability of particular critics to 
act as a barometer of public opinion of a film. To check this, the model is rerun with 
spread replaced by score variables for each newspaper critic. Starting with the full set 
of eight critics and deleting insignificant terms (with p-value > 0.10) we find, in Table 
5, that only the Daily Mirror remains with significant impacts on box office revenues 
over and above average UK critic. With this newspaper included, our sample size 
drops to 377. We face a trade-off between greater precision in identity of critic and 
                                                          
19 The excluded films are typically non-US productions. An interesting question is whether US critics 
have higher regard for US as opposed to UK films, leading to bias. Actually the reverse is true with 
mean score of 5.08 for US films and 5.79 for UK productions. This result itself reflects some selection  
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information loss incurred in order to include particular critics in the analysis. With the 
smaller sample size, some coefficients that were significant in the broader analysis are 
no longer so, such as the interaction terms between prize and press advertising. From 
the resulting parsimonious model, the Daily Mirror critic has an additional significant 
impact (at 5 per cent) on total box office revenues. A one point increase in Daily 
Mirror score is correlated with a 7.2 per cent rise in total revenues, for given average 
critic score. Hence, it appears that the Daily Mirror has much greater weighting than 
other newspapers in the impact of critical reviews, highlighting the relative 




The primary aim of this paper has been to assess the relative importance of different 
quality signals for success of films released in the United Kingdom.  These signals 
include those under the control of the film companies themselves, and so may give an 
indication of the companies’ perceptions of the quality of films they produce and 
distribute.  These signals include budget devoted to a film, the amounts spent on 
different advertising media marketing films, and distribution by a major studio. A 
second set of quality signals is not ostensibly under the control of film companies, 
including critic reviews and the nomination for and award of prizes. The paper 
explores the different impacts of all of these quality signals on UK box office success, 
and the impact of variables constructed to capture the interaction between various 
pairs of quality signals. Our regression models also take account of factors such as 
certificate and genre of film and US box office success. 
                                                                                                                                                                      




The analysis represents one of only a very limited number of papers to examine UK, 
rather than US, box office success, but also uses a larger dataset than has typically 
been the norm in examining the UK film industry.  It has the advantage that unlike 
much of the literature modelling box office success, film advertising expenditures are 
divided according to advertising media used.  Using a Two Stage Least Squares 
method, with standard errors bootstrapped, we find that television advertising has a 
supply-side, but not demand-side, effect while the other categories of advertising have 
demand-side effects only. The impact of press advertising is only apparent for films 
nominated for major Academy and BAFTA awards.  We also undertook a thorough 
exploration of the impact of critic reviews using US as well as UK critics scores, and 
looking at spread as well as average scores. The role of dispersion of critics’ review 
scores was firmly established and we have found that critics’ scores from reviews in 
mass-market newspapers play a particularly important role as predictors of film 
success in the UK.  
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Table 1 
Studies of advertising expenditure and critical reviews in box office revenues 
Study Place, time period 






at 5%, X not 
significant) 
Studies using advertising 
 















Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) 
 
Prag and Casavant (1994) 
 
Studies using critical reviews 
 
Basuroy et al. (2003) 
 
Chang and Ki (2005) 
 
Collins et al. (2002) 
 
Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) 
 
Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) 
 
Eliashberg and Shugan (1997) 
 
Litman and Kohl (1989) 
 




Ravid and Basuroy (1999) 
 
Reinstein and Snyder (2005) 
 




UK, 1999, 138 
 




US, 1991-93, 162  
 
US, 2000-02, 431 
 
UK, 1998, 216 
 
US, 1999, 164 
 
UK, 1999, 138 
 
US, 1991-92, 56 
 
US, 1981-86, 464 
 
US, 1990, 195 
 
US, 1991-93, 175 
 
US, 1991-93, 175 
 
US, 1999, 609 
 
US, 1990-91, 101 
 







































































Descriptive statistics for continuous variables (conditional on positive values)  
(monetary values in £m 1996 prices) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum  Maximum 
UK total box office revenue 4.82 7.75 0.14 60.1 
 
US opening box office revenue 
 














































































Two Stage Least Squares Estimates: Main Model 
N = 546    Dependent Variables 




Log Opening Screens 
Log outdoor advertising 
Prize*log press advertising 
Prize 
Log radio advertising 







Log TV advertising 



























































































Two Stage Least Squares Estimates: With Average US critic 
N = 523    Dependent Variables 




Log Opening Screens 
Log outdoor advertising 
Prize*log press advertising 
Prize 
Log radio advertising 
Average UK critic 
Spread 






Log TV advertising 






























































































Two Stage Least Squares Estimates: With Particular UK Critics 
N = 377    Dependent Variables 




Log Opening Screens 
Log outdoor advertising 
Log radio advertising 
Average UK critic 
Daily Mirror 





Log TV advertising 
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